The videos are harrowing. Children lying wet in the mud, choking like beached fish. Among them are the usual White Helmets fakers and con men, but this is clearly not just one of their chicken-blood-and-chalk-powder B-movies. They treat their “patients” roughly, dumping them unceremoniously on the ground, flipping them like carcasses, jerking a dying child’s head around for the camera like they’re putting a cantaloupe on display on a streetcart. Nevertheless, this time it’s mostly real.
Their “doctor” Shajul Islam, who claims they are victims of Syrian sarin, is a former ISIS terrorist who escaped a long sentence in Belmarsh prison thanks to the journalists he kidnapped & shot mysteriously declining to testify in a trial where they were the plaintiffs. He is clearly lying, as the victims show no sign of nerve damage, a fact backed up by Turkish doctors in Reyhanli. If the poison that killed so many of them were sarin, not only would there be no survivors, but the “aid workers” with no protective clothing would have suffered the same fate. They would have died in extreme agony and bone-snapping contortions, bathing in their own bodily fluids, as their nervous systems collapsed.
Most telling of all, sarin is odorless but multiple mainstream sources like AFP and The Telegraph have reported the presence of a strong stench of rotting matter – an odor that didn’t result in the death of those who smelled it, as it would with any self-respecting military chemical weapon.
Yet, despite all the lies, they have been poisoned. By what, how, when, and where? And who are they? It’s hard to tell from the available photos since their Al Qaeda-affiliated sources downsized them to obliterate details like surface wounds or large pupils that would challenge their sarin story. Nor have they provided any record of the site of the chemical incident. The earliest point where we see the victims is several hours after the 6.30 AM airstrike that triggered the incident. They are lying in an open triage area inside the town waiting to be transported to the cave-and-bunker “hospital” outside of town.
Witnesses told The Telegraph that the airstrike hit Corniche Street in the north of the town. Al Qaeda propagandist Hadi al Abdullah staged a dog-and-pony show around a crater near the grain silos in the north of the town but what the crater contained was a bent and ruptured 122mm tube that might have come from a Grad rocket and a fuse plate from a larger weapon, none of them having any connection to aerial weapons. It is not known at this time whether Corniche Street is the street in front of the grain silo or a street branching off from it and going south, on which a building was hit by the airstrike, producing a cloud of smoke that differed from the other three in that it remained close to the ground.
The attack happened around 6.32am local time. A video distributed by opposition activists claiming to be of the moments after the air strike, which hit Corniche Street in a northern neighbourhood of Khan Sheikhoun, showed several large plumes of smoke.
Later in the day, the choking and dying victims were carried on the backs of pickup trucks to the former Syrian Army Camp Khazanat refueling base southwest of the town where the White Helmets have set up a hospital for treating the Al Qaeda-affiliated Jaish al Izza fighters who hold the town. After the pandemonium of ineffective rescue and treatment efforts, the relatives of the victims arrived in the late afternoon, which tells us that at least some of the victims are bona fide and not hostages abducted during the battles raging at Hama, a short hop to the south.
The bunker-and-tunnel complex was hit by an airstrike later on, destroying a warehouse next to the subterranean hospital’s entrance, where I and others initially mistakenly assumed that the chemical weapons that killed the townsfolk were stored. Apparently the building contained inocuous stores. The bunkers and tunnels of the White Helmet hospital don’t contain any more clues to the truth than this.
The Showcase Crater
The truth begins to emerge with the video shot by a drone operated by the Gaziantep-based Qasioun News Agency, which just “happened” to be hovering north of Khan Sheikhoun at daybreak, when a Syrian Su-22 fired 4 missiles at the town. Frames from the video spliced together by Eliott Higgins, the US- and Qatari-funded self-taught “expert” of military forensics, show clearly where the 4 missiles hit. By Higgins’s own geolocation, none of them hit the street in front of the grain silos in the north of the town. Though Higgins won’t admit it, Hadi al Abdullah’s widely-publicized performance around that hole in the ground is, like most of his “reporting,” a hoax.
There is, however, an impact geolocated at a building not far from the grain silo crater, producing a cloud of smoke on the Turkish drone video that doesn’t rise like the other other three and is a different color. A video of the location shows that the building has been destroyed, indicating that the munition used was conventional. A chemical weapon has a very small explosive payload, enough to disperse the chemical without burning it. It certainly can’t destroy a building.
Then we have the Pentagon’s own strangely low-quality, barely legible graphic that was the supposed justification for the US Tomahawk missile strike on the Al Shayrat airbase of Homs, from where the Su-22 that attacked Khan Sheikhoun took off.
Chrisitian Triebert, a recent addition to Bellingcat who is an experienced and serious conflict analyst, unlike the couch-bound Higgins, pasted the Pentagon’s low-resolution radar flight track as accurately as possible on a larger map. The result shows us that almost all military flights from Al Shayrat circumvented Khan Sheikhoun and none of them were recorded in the north of the town, where the Pentagon and Al Qaeda’s showcase crater is located.
So now we have video from a Turkish quad drone that was manifestly launched in anticipation of the airstrike (not having the range to loiter), the Pentagon’s own radar track, and two witnesses filmed in front of a bombed-out building geolocated at 200m from Hadi al Abdullah’s crater, all telling us that the April 4 early morning airstrike hit a totally different area of the town than the crater bandied about by Al Qaeda’s media man and his Pentagon support team.
Now let’s get to the part where the story becomes one of an ambush. How did the Turks know when there was going to be an airstrike on Khan Sheikhoun to have a short-range quad drone up & running to record it? Former DIA Colonel Patrick Lang tells us:
ANALYSIS by retired Col. Patrick LANG
Donald Trump’s decision to launch cruise missile strikes on a Syrian Air Force Base was based on a lie. In the coming days the American people will learn that the Intelligence Community knew that Syria did not drop a military chemical weapon on innocent civilians in Idlib. Here is what happened.
The Russians briefed the United States on the proposed target. This is a process that started more than two months ago. There is a dedicated phone line that is being used to coordinate and deconflict (i.e., prevent US and Russian air assets from shooting at each other) the upcoming operation.
The United States was fully briefed on the fact that there was a target in Idlib that the Russians believes was a weapons/explosives depot for Islamic rebels.
The Syrian Air Force hit the target with conventional weapons. All involved expected to see a massive secondary explosion. That did not happen. Instead, smoke, chemical smoke, began billowing from the site. It turns out that the Islamic rebels used that site to store chemicals, not sarin, that were deadly. The chemicals included organic phosphates and chlorine and they followed the wind and killed civilians.
You don’t need to be a former DIA officer to know that Russia and the US brief each other on the targets they will hit in Syria. It’s what kept this F-15 and A-10 flying south of Idlib from running into Russian air-to-air or S-300 missiles. It’s called deconfliction. The US knew – until deconfliction was suspended by Russia after the US Tomahawk strike – where the Russian and Syrian air forces would operate as a matter of course, being regularly notified by the Russians who assumed that they were after the same enemies: ISIS and Al Qaeda, not the Syrian government.
That’s of course until the US pulled a fast one and told the Turks that the Syrians were going to hit what it knew was an Al Qaeda chemical weapons factory. The Russians and Syrians had discovered several of these in East Aleppo, such as this one in Masakeen Hanano visited by RT reporter Lizzie Phelan:
None of these chemical weapons, nor the great many times they were fired at both civilians and government forces, nor the great many victims they made, were ever acknowledged by the UN’s relevant authority the OPCW, as the US always blocked the evidence supplied, somewhat naively, by the Russians from being reported. The US was now going to bankroll this supression of information that had generated the near-universal belief that any chemical weapons had to come from the government side, despite the fact that the OPCW had declared all Syrian chemical weapons destroyed on January 4, 2016.
The ambush was prepared first of all by supplying the first responders with Level A hazmat suits and gas masks. Shajul Islam, who appeared to know exactly what was in store for the town, expressed his relief:
I could be wrong but I don’t think the White Helmets knew what was coming because their shock and anger appeared genuine. Tellingly, they totally forgot to don their new hazmat suits. However Hadi al Abdullah, who had prepared his crater coverup scenario and brought along some of his trusted extras to liven the scene, was probably in the loop as well.
Shajul Islam, Probably an Mi6 Asset
Next, Shajul Islam was ready to say the s-word and the usual suspect NGOs – MSF, Amnesty, etc. – were waiting for the signal to underwrite the “sarin” judgement. At this point it might be useful to look back at who this Shajul Islam character is.
The main characters of the story are Omar Bakri’s apprentice-jihadi (and like him, one of Londonistan’s Mi5 asset luminaries) Anjem Choudari, who took over Her Majesty’s jihad business after the old Afghanistan/Bosnia hands of Al Mouhajiroun had either been jailed or offshored like Bakri. Choudari set up Sharia4Belgium, taking advantage of the disarray of the security services in that crisis-ridden country. Choudari and his Belgium rep Fouad Belkacem reeled in angry young Muslim men – a lot of those in racist Europe – and showed them how the Koran wasn’t just an ordinary religious text but a recipe for religious war.
Shajul Islam, an East London kid, was one of Choudari’s converts. As Sharia4Belgium neared the end of its service life with a police crackdown appearing on the horizon, a batch of apprentice-jihadis were taken to Syria under the wing of Amr al Absi, a Syrian former comrade-in-jihad of Abu Musab Zarqawi in Iraq. Amr and his brother Firas set up shop in 2012 at the Bab al Hawa border crossing, which they took over from the FSA and over which they hoisted the first ISIS flag in Syria.
As bad luck would have it, two Western “journalists,” John Cantlie and Jeroen Oerlemans were just crossing over from Turkey at this time to show the world what wonderful democracy-loving people the thieving FSA cannibals were. The hardcore Salafists of the Al Absi gang had no sympathy for the FSA or for the Crusader journalists doing their PR, so they kidnapped them and began to discuss how they would execute them on live video. Shajul Islam was just as gung-ho about beheading the kuffar as all the rest. However their camp was eventually attacked by Turkish intelligence, who freed the two journos. Amr al Absi’s big brother Firas was killed, starting the feud between the FSA and ISIS.
When Al Absi lost Bab al Hawa, he joined forces with a bunch of Georgian Chechens led by Tarkan Batirashvili aka Abu Omar and eventually convinced Omar to give baya to Abu Bakr Baghdadi, head of ISIS.
Cantlie and Oerlemans, returning home, told Scotland Yard about the South London NHS doctor jihadi who had kidnapped and terrorized them, so that Shajul Islam was duly arrested on his return and put on trial for terror offenses. However British intelligence was in no mind to lose such a valuable asset so Cantlie and Oerlemans were persuaded not to testify and the terrorist walked. His doctor’s license was, however, taken from him in a secret hearing.
Neither of the two journalists will ever be able to tell this story, however, as Oerlemans was killed by a sniper and Cantlie ended up in an orange ISIS jumpsuit.
And so it was that Shajul Islam ended up as Her Majesty’s Physician to Al Qaeda in Idlib, in close contact with various Mi6 front NGO’s and the DGSE’s very own MSF, casting the sarin stone at the Syrian government to create a pretext to bomb the Syrian airbase that was pivotal in the Syrian military’s push towards the Euphrates, where US troops are setting up bases and appearing in growing numbers.
As such, the Khan Sheikhoun ambush bears a great resemblance to the September 2016 bombing of Syrian forces at Deir ez Zor by US aircraft. Both operations, no doubt masterminded by the same shifty US Lt Gen Stephen Townsend, aim to weaken the Syrian government’s hand east of the Euphrates, where the US intends to set up a buffer zone between Syria and its Shiite allies in Iraq and Iran.
Postscript: Was the Ambush also a Mass-Murder?
Professor Emeritus Theodore Postol of MIT just published a paper entitled “A Quick Turnaround Assessment of the White House Intelligence Report Issued on April 11, 2017 About the Nerve Agent Attack in Khan Shaykhun, Syria” that refutes the entire White House intelligence report of April 11 as amateurish, false, misleading, and not a genuine intelligence product. Postol’s main argument is that what Hadi al Abdullah’s showcase crater contains is not an aerial or artillery munition but an improvised sarin explosive device consisting of a 122mm artillery rocket-type pipe sealed at both ends and filled with sarin, which was ruptured by an explosive placed on top of it.
This hypothesis if verified would make Hadi al Abdullah not only an Al Qaeda propagandist but possibly a mass murderer. There are however obvious problems with the hypothesis. While the IED theory seems likely, the problems of producing and deploying sarin remain. The Aum Shinrikyo sect constructed a veritable chemical factory to produce their sarin and despite releasing it in 5 closed subway cars only managed to kill 12 people. Even supposing that the Khan Sheikhoun sarin was supplied by a major industrialized country and not locally made, it’s unlikely that such a small quantity released in the open on homes with doors and windows closed would cause dozens of deaths. Adding to this the odor reported by many witnesses, we have to conclude that even if there were sarin in that pipe, it wasn’t the only chemical weapon involved in the mass deaths.
That said, whatever evidence may have existed in that crater is now so tainted that we will never know. For example, the circular fuse plate reminiscent of those on the East Ghouta chemical rockets of 2013 that was most likely planted there is now gone.
U.S. general David Petraeus, who got famous losing the Iraq and Afghanistan wars, made COIN a household acronym with his widely-publicised COIN (Counterinsurgency) Manual published in December 2016. The “protecting civilians” and “minimum force” mantras in Petraeus’s “COIN Guidance,” carrying echoes of the “hearts and minds” rhetoric of the Vietnam War, made it sound like the US military would henceforth win wars against the people it sought to conquer by holding hands with them and singing Kumbaya.
In reality, both the COIN hype and the “troop surge” that accompanied it were smoke screens for what Petraeus was really doing in Iraq, namely executing the “Salvador Option,” consisting of unleashing death squads to ethnically cleanse the troublesome Sunnis. To this day, the punditry and the general public alike believe that the US achieved a momentary success in Iraq with the fabed “surge” and the “Sunni awakening,” whereas nothing could be further from the truth. The Sunni insurgency was temporarily checked simply by indiscriminately killing, torturing, and otherwise terrorising the Sunnis.
In Afghanistan, Petraeus’s understudy Stan McChrystal continued on the same tack, talking the “sharing caring” COIN talk while savaging civilians with an unprecedent number of night raids, drone strikes, and “civcas” (civilian casualties) to drive home the message that backing the Taliban “isn’t cost-free.” Petraeus and McChrystal were not anomalies, however. They were a continuation of the counterinsurgency approach that dates back at least to the Vietnam War’s Operation Phoenix – if unbridled savagery can be called an “approach.” As we demonstrated in part 2 of this investigation, nothing much has changed in the U.S.’s “approach” to counterinsurgency since waterboarding was invented – it was called the “water cure” and was invariably fatal back then – at the dawn of the 20th century during the U.S. war on Filipino freedom fighters.
In part 2, we also noted that the British and German empires had adopted highly brutal and genocidal methods of counterinsurgency against populations unwilling to be conquered. Counterinsurgency was “refined” in later years by the French army in Indochina and Algeria: more torture, less killing. However, COIN has always been about state terrorism because there is simply no other way to subdue, even partially or temporarily, a popular rebellion, which is what we call an insurgency. There is no such thing as an invading or occupying army “winning hearts and minds.” It is from this operational and historical perspective that we have to examine an important claim made by military historian Edward J. Erickson in his article “Bayonets on Musa Dagh: Ottoman Counterinsurgency Operations – 1915”  that the Ottoman army in the Musa Dagh area operated within the strict limits of contemporary counterinsurgency doctrine, whose brutal nature hasn’t much changed since then.
 Edward J. Erickson, “Bayonets on Musa Dagh: Ottoman Counterinsurgency Operations – 1915” The Journal of Strategic Studies Vol. 28, No. 3, June 2005, pp.529-548
We’ve traveled to many continents to visit the various genocides committed by the Great Powers at the dawn of the century. Now we return to the Eastern Mediterranean, where the Musa Dagh Armenians were, as legend has it, miraculously saved from the so-called “first genocide of the 20th century” in the nick of time by the French navy, which just happened to be passing through.
“Even children no longer hoped for a warship to pass along the Syrian coast. And if by some unbelievable miracle, against all reason, a warship did appear on the horizon, who would be stupid enough to believe the ship’s watch would even notice that ridiculous handkerchief hanging on a pole atop the Dish Terrace?”
“For many months no one in Alexandretta had seen even the shadow of a warship far out at sea.”
“First, there were no French warships of any description in the Northeast Mediterranean.”
The Forty Days of Musa Dagh, David R. Godine edition, 2012
Was the Clician coast really that devoid of French naval traffic in the summer of 1915? Let’s see what the commander of the French fleet there had to say about that. This is from Admiral Louis Dartige du Fournet’s book Souvenirs de guerre d’un amiral 1914-1916, “War Memoirs of an Admiral, 1914-1916.” Plon, 1920. pp. 33-43.
The French fleet was omnipresent in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Bay of Alexandretta, in particular, “drew it like a magnet.” There was nothing miraculous about the Guichen showing up just when the Musa Dagh rebels needed it.
[. . .]
On July 9, we anchor at Castelorizo. This small island, between Rhodes and the Cape of Gelidonia, is an important maritime trade hub.
[. . .]
Back at Port Said on July 12, we had quite a serious alarm on the 14th.
[. . .]
On August 12, the Jeanne d’Arc arrived at Jaffa.
[. . .]
During the end of July and the whole month of August , the British seaplane carriers Anne and Raven salled the entire coast. Chalakdere bridge, Adana, and Mersina were bombed anew.
[. . .]
In accordance with the orders of the commander in chief, we blew up the German ship Syria in the port of Beirut on August 15.
[. . .]
On August 21, I assembled in front of Beirut the Jeanne d’arc, the d’Estrées, the Jauréguiberry, the Charner, and the seaplane carrier Anne.
[. . .]
Seizing Rouad Island (September 1 1915)
On September 1 at 9:30 AM we landed a party of 90 men…As the city notables who came on board the Jeanne d’Arc on August 30 had predicted, the population greeted us with joy.
[. . .]
Rescue of the Armenians of Musa Dagh (September 1915).
In the first days of September, the cruiser Guichen, skippered by Frigate Captain Brisson, was cruising along the coast of Antioch, when it saw signals on land…
Here is how another naval officer in the same fleet described their mission:
“At the outset of the war, our colors flew in all the ports of the coast: Antalia, Mersin, Alexandretta, Latakia, Tripoli, Beirut, Sidon, Akko, Caïffa, and Jaffa, while our religious protectorate had united around the French flag the Maronites, the Melkites, the Syriacs, The Armenians, and the Chaldeans, an immense clientele to which were added, in Lebanon, the Metoualis and the Orthodox.”
-Paul Chack, Marins à la bataille: Méditerrannée 1914-1918. Gerfaut, 2002. p.141
Chack, who was an ordnance officer in Admiral Du Fournet’s Mediterranean fleet, also expresses the Great Power interest in attacking the Berlin-Baghdad railway at its weakest point, Alexandretta, a stone’s throw from Musa Dagh:
“The Gulf of Alexandretta is truly a sensitive point of Turkish lines of communication. Its wonderful shore and its well-sheltered port seem to invite troop transports to anchor there.
Very early on, as a first warning, the admiral of the British navy in Egypt sent the cruiser Doris there, whose demolitions team blew up locomotives, demolished bridges, and gutted the railway. Excellent work.”
The Spy Ship Doris and Other Allied Ships
British intelligence and sabotage ship HMS Doris in the Bay of Alexandretta. Misnamed a “light cruiser,” she was lightly armed. Two other British ships of similar design, the Philomel and the Proserpine, assisted her.
Paul Chack was well informed. The British intelligence cruiser Doris, hosting the semi-famous British spy Harry Pirie-Gordon, was the most important British asset attacking the Ottoman Achilles’ heel, the stretch of the Berlin-Baghdad railway near the Bay of Alexandretta. The Doris’s logbook was classified until 1966, as it contained the names of many agents landed by the ship on the Cilician coast, as well as ordnance for the Armenian insurgents. In Military historian Edward J. Erickson’s accounts of the Doris’s missions, the second trip beginning January 7, 1914 involves the landing of an “Egyptian spy” and the taking of several prisoners for interrogation, most of them Armenians who volunteered for the position. There are also encounters at Alexandretta with the French cruiser Jauréguiberry, which apparently failed to land the spy and passed him on to the Doris, and the French destroyer Requin, which brought a “proclamation” to be distributed in Tripoli, no doubt calling on Arabs to revolt.
The German-built iron railroad bridge over the Ceyhan River at Çakaldere was one of the favorite targets of the French, British, and Russian warships visiting the Gulf of Alexandretta.
Erickson contends that the Doris’s activities targeting the Baghdad railway on the Cilician coast were the single most important factor that pushed the Ottomans to station 7% of their forces there merely to guard the railway against saboteurs, weakening the more active fronts, as well as to order the deportation of the Armenians in the region, who were induced and forced to collaborate with the British landing forces and spies. 
There is however an obvious discrepancy in Erickson’s reasoning, as the Doris was pulled out of the area and sent to Gallipoli in March 1915, whereas the Armenians were deported in August 1915. The reason for the Armenian deportation wasn’t the British navy, but the French one that replaced it, the same one that “miraculously” appeared in front of Musa Dagh to save the Armenians.
Maybe some readers expected me to say that Erickson was wrong because the Armenians posed no threat. They certainly would have preferred not to and the Ottoman authorities would have preferred that they continue leading their productive lives right where they were, but too much had been done “for” the Ottoman Armenians of Cilicia by their western “protectors” over the decades for them not to collaborate with the imperialists (in the illusion that they would achieve independence).
Unlike Erickson’s account that has the Doris performing just three missions from December 1914 to March 1915, the British Navy’s professional journal The Naval Review relates a much more sustained activity during that period, ending with a bombardment that took a very heavy toll on a garrison defending the railway, after which the flag was passed to the French ship Jauréguiberry: 
The Russian cruiser Askold, unable to return to Russia when the war broke out, was part of the Great Powers fleet pounding the Ottoman Mediterranean coast with her twelve 152mm guns and her impressive 24-knot top speed.
Even the smallest French warship in the Eastern Mediterranean, the coast guard cutter Requin, had far greater firepower than any of the British so-called “cruisers.”.
graph unit. A mirror aimed at the receiving party is used to send Morse coded messages.
Not only was the Doris much more active than Erickson suggested but it was reinforced or relieved during its coaling trips to Port Said by the light cruisers Proserpine (10-25 January 1915) and Philomel (5-17 February 1915) . The log books of the Proserpine also show the non-logged arrival of the HMS Philomel, as well as the presence of the HMS Doris, the USS Tenessee, the Russian cruiser Askold, the French cruisers Amiral Charner and Dentrecasteaux, and the French warship Requin. The log books of the Philomel indicate that it exchanged written messages with the shore on three separate occasions, the messages being transmitted by boat parties from the shore carrying white truce flags. Armenian Ottoman troops and functionaries willingly surrendered to the British and offered up information , as did Arabs further down the coast. A signalling device called a heliograph was found hidden in the reeds, just after a suspicious Armenian’s capture  near the strategic Payas bridge, regularly targeted by the Great Power navies prowling the Gulf of Alexandretta. The bombardments and attacks by landing parties on the railway skirting the coast, the roads, and all other visible infrastructure, as well as the troops defending them, were uninterrupted.
Although the British mischief on the Cilician coast was greater than Captain Larkin’s capers with the little Doris, it was still just a 3-month affair involving what the British optimistically called “light cruisers” (Doris’s previous sail-powered namesake was correctly called a frigate) that didn’t pack anything bigger than a couple of 100 or 120mm guns. In contrast, even the French coast-guard vessel Requin had two walloping 274mm guns and six 100mm ones. On February 3, 1915, she would knock out two entire Ottoman divisions attacking the Suez Canal. The number of ships and the firepower that France deployed in Cilicia was several orders of magnitude greater than Britain’s desultory efforts for the simple reason that the Lord of the Admiralty Churchill had staked his career on punching through the Dardanelles with his ships alone rather than allow Lord Kitchener’s army to land at Alexandretta and neatly snip off the entire raison d’être of the Kaiser’s war, his wild hope of taking Suez and seizing the British Raj.
Unfortunately, the French navy logs are not as readily available as the British ones. What I know of their activities is second-hand, through the memoirs of officers like Admiral du Fournet or the naval historian and former destroyer captain Paul Chack. They make no bones about what they were doing in the Levant, however. They weren’t there in such force to fight the nonexistent Ottoman navy, bombard the few paltry coastal military installations, or even to starve the Ottoman army out with their embargo. They were there to whip up a fifth column.
[. . .]
Jihad was declared in the mosques of Istanbul – a frightening declaration for the 1.5 million Christians who make up two-thirds of Syria’s population. Instinctively their thoughts turn to the open sea. Will the French come, as they always have?
Arwad (Rouad) Island, a former Crusader stronghold facing Tartous, became a French naval and intelligence base for the colonization of the Levant.
The French intention of co-opting the civilian Ottoman populations that they had seduced with their schools and churches to compensate for their lack of manpower, which they had frittered away by the millions in the trenches of the Marne, was a familiar leitmotif of the Balkans and Middle East. The British were marshaling Greek forces to reinforce their troops at Gallipoli and bribing the Bedouins and other Arabs to rise up against the Ottomans. The French were trying to regroup the Serbians and send them back to Serbia in order to cut off the Berlin-Bagdad railway there. They also had plans for the Christians of Syria and Cilicia, whom they considered their “clientele.” Initially, they used them as spies. In August 1915, just before rescuing the Armenians of Musa Dagh, the French fleet occupied Arwad (Rouad) Island, facing Tartous, Syria, and turned it into a spy base. Just as French and British battleships in the Gulf of Iskenderun communicated with spies on shore, French military personnel on Arwad directly controlled spies in Tartous.
French spy chief Father Antonin Jaussen with T.E. Lawrence at El Wedj, an Ottoman port that they helped capture on the Arabian side of the Red Sea.
French and British ships also landed a variety of agents from different ethnicities to conduct and organize subversion and sabotage further inland. As the French consuls, military attachés, and other officials running this spy menagerie before the war were unavailable with the commencement of hostilities, the task fell mainly to the missionaries, who were militarized, just as the British militarized their scholars and journalists in the Middle East. The head of the French spy ring was Father Antonin Jaussen of the Dominican order. Father Jaussin’s intelligence reports at the Vincennes naval archives  reveal the thorough co-option of Ottoman minorities by the French:
- “Rapport de Negueditc Krikorian” – Report of (Armenian) Neguedich Krikorian
- “Renseignements fournis par Mich Ibn Isaac Sunaa grec-orthodoxe de Kérak” – Intelligence provided by Mish Ibn Isaac Sunaa, a Greek Orthodox from Kerak
- “Interrogatoire de Léon Cassarian” – Debriefing of (Armenian) Leon Cassarian
- “Rapport de Radji Ibrahim” – Report of Raji Ibrahim
Carving Up the Turkey
The Infamous Middle East carve-up map signed by Sykes and Picot in May 1916. Most of it is red, i.e. British, because the whole idea was Baronet Mark Sykes’s in the first place. He coined the names Syria, Iraq, and Palestine, designed the red-green-white-black “Arab” flag, and planted a (Yellow) Jewish state in the middle of the mess he created, afterwards dedicating a monument to himself pictured as a crusader with the words “Rejoice Jerusalem.”
The fate of the Armenians of Musa Dagh and Cilicia was decided not so much by the German general staff and their Ottoman underlings but, as was the case for all Ottoman peoples, by the Great Power carve-up of the Ottoman state. Weakened by the reactionary Janissaries and their Ulama allies, the Ottomans were declared “the Sick Man of Europe” (they were considered European then) and the squabbling began not on how to cure the Ottoman state but on how to butcher it. All the squabbling parties – British, Russian, French, and even Egyptian – would pretend at one time or another to “help” the sick man onto his feet, only to tear a piece off of him. This is, after all, what the Great Powers had been doing throughout the 19th century all over the globe.
Britain, the top global power, was constantly in fear that its far-away source of riches, India, would be torn from its grasp. Its lines of communication with the Raj were vulnerable. The new power in the East, Russia, wanted to send its navy into the Mediterranean and the Turkish Straits were blocking the way, which was exactly how Britain wanted things to stay. Britain tried unsuccessfully, with the help of the Ottomans and French, to stop Russia’s naval ambitions with the Crimean War, and when it failed, switched from open war to proxy war and diplomacy.
The Balkan wars were such a proxy conflict where Britain and Russia set up rival client-states, while blocking the path of Kaiser Wilhelm’s Drang Nach Osten at the expense of the Muslims and Jews, who were ethnically cleansed. Right afterwards, the Kaiser got Austria to create a pretext for invading Serbia and relaunched his railroad into the Ottoman east – namely by sacrificing the unpopular Archduke Ferdinand, regarded as too soft on the Serbs. Germany’s European enemies then decided that the long Ottoman limbo had served its purpose and the time had come to destroy that state and chop up its territory. As Marks Sykes bluntly told Lord Kitchener, “Turkey must cease to be.”
As the battleships lined up before Gallipoli, the partition negotiations began between Britain, France and Russia, which demanded and obtained first dibs on Istanbul and the Dardanelles. Then the Dodecanese Islands and Adalia (Antalya) were offered to Italy to motivate it to attack Austria. Finally, France presented its claim on the Levant, and the infamous Sykes-Picot agreement that wrought havoc with the Middle East was penned. While their spies incited rebellion promising freedom and independence, the Great Powers had already mapped out their new colonies. France got a surprisingly good deal out of the Sykes-Picot bargain, landing a large colony in Cilicia, frustrating Armenian hopes for independence, as well as Syria. The catch, however, was that France had to supply troops for a ground offensive from Egypt, after the defeat at Gallipoli. France could only rustle up a mere 6200 of its own troops to add to Allenby’s ten British divisions but with the addition of the Armenian Legion, its contribution grew to divisional strength rather than a paltry regiment.
That, in the end, had been the aim of France’s actions all along. The French navy’s activities in Cilicia, intensive though they were, did not stop the Ottomans from using the railways near the Cilician shores to mount an assault on the Suez Canal. They did not disrupt Ottoman communications, so vulnerable to the massed French navy, to a significant degree. The French effort to regroup the Serbian army and use it to cut the Berlin-Baghdad railway in the Balkans also serendipitously “failed.” Severing the tenuous German lines of communications with the East would have allowed a swift British victory, leading to the loss of the Levant for France, as Mark Sykes and his mentor Lord Kitchener had no intention of letting France have a cut of the Middle East pie  .
Therefore France didn’t push very hard at all against Churchill’s misguided Gallipoli plan and allowed the Ottomans to continue shifting troops and matériel to the Middle East, where Ottoman and German forces dealt the British forces in Mesopotamia the most crushing defeat in the Empire’s history, taking their commanders prisoner. As Britain’s losses grew in the Dardanelles and Mesopotamia, so did its need for France’s assistance, and the price it would have to pay for it. What the French did instead of slashing the Ottoman arteries at Alexandretta was to create the conditions for raising an Armenian army, which they deployed in Palestine, as a bargaining chip to secure from Britain their Levantine colonies on the lands that had been promised to the Armenians and Arabs.
The French Mediterranean Squadron’s cannonades, landings, and spies weren’t so much a military operation as armed propaganda, designed to impress the Armenians and Arabs with France’s power and convince them of France’s inevitable victory. France’s blockade of the Mediterranean coast that caused famines wasn’t directed so much against the Ottoman military as against the civilians, who were forced to collaborate with France to avoid starvation. The subversive activities by France’s collaborators on land weren’t as significant militarily as they were politically, leading the Ottoman government to treat its minorities with increasing distrust and harshness, thus pushing them into the arms of the imperialists.
Musa Dagh was the culmination of these French efforts. The Armenians of Musa Dagh were first radicalized by Hunchak and Dashnak agents either brought in by the French and British navies or infiltrated through other networks such as the Protestant missions or even the Singer company’s sales network  . When these foreign shenanigans and the local agitation they produced, like the February 1915 Zeitoun uprising, sufficiently alarmed the Ottomans, they produced the desired behavior, viz. an increasingly brutal crackdown. The Musa Daghians, already harangued by Hunchak and Dashnak militants, were further radicalized by the government crackdown, and tensions rose to the point where the Germans and Ottomans both decided that the Armenians had to go. The Musa Daghians then put up a fight with French arms and with the cannons of the French navy supporting them, completing their transition from peaceful villagers to France’s colonial soldiers.
As the underdog of the “Entente cordiale,” France’s stealth strategy of hanging on to its interests in the Levant at Britain’s expense worked well. Lord Kitchener and Mark Sykes had intended to cut France out of the Ottoman carve-up altogether. A German mine took care of Kitchener and the crushing cost of Churchill’s Gallipoli follies forced Sykes’s hand. France shrewdly obtained the command of the Eastern Mediterranean after saving Britain’s bacon at the Suez Canal by blasting the attacking Ottoman army to bits. It then studiously avoided causing any serious disruption to the Ottomans’ fragile rail links at Alexandretta until General Townshend’s Poona division from India was destroyed, leaving the British no option but to attack from Egypt, where France could also join in, both in the action and the spoils. How fortunate that the Musa Daghians were already right there in Port Said to provide the troops for this undertaking!
France played its limited cards right and the Armenians were back in their homes with minimum losses under the tricolor flag before long. Then came the fatal mistake that caused both their downfall and France’s defeat: Instead of disbanding the Armenian Legion or giving its troops civilian jobs, France opted to use them to police its new Cilician colony. Instead, they went on a revenge rampage, causing the local population (mainly the Kurds of Marash) to take up arms against them and the French. When the French finally disbanded the Armenian Legion in 1919 and reassigned the Armenians as railway guards, they refused to comply and continued their attacks. The result, as U.S. High Commissioner Admiral Mark Bristol reported , was a catastrophe for all involved:
The self-inflicted French defeat in Cilicia, caused by the blowback from its radicalization and exploitation of the local Armenians as a fifth column against the Ottomans, was the watershed event that brought about the victory of the Kemalists, who were even firmer than Enver and Talat’s C.U.P. in the belief that Turks could not coexist in their country on an equal footing with other etnicities. This not only brought about the total ethnic cleansing of Armenians, who fled Kemalist-occupied lands in droves, and Greeks, who did the same in the Aegean, but of Kurds as well, who were forced to reliquish their autonomy, language, history, and wealth to the Turks.
French forces handed over their arms to the Turks, to be used against the Greeks, who were Britain’s equivalent of the Armenian Legion. This convinced Lenin to override Stalin’s (prophetic) objections against aiding the treacherous Turks and turned the Turkish nationalist fortunes around with generous donations of Bolshevik arms, gold, and military advisors. After his final victory, Mustafa Kemal strode into Cilicia, cleansed of its Armenians, and told the local merchants in Adana:
 Edward J. Erickson. “Captain Larkin and the Turks: The Strategic Impact of the Operations of HMS Doris in Early 1915,” Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 46, No. 1, 151–162, January 2010.
“Captain Frank Larkin’s voyages in command of HMS Doris in the winter of 1914–15 had an effect out of all proportion to their duration and scale. Larkin’s activities were so actively consistent and aggressive that the Ottomans came to believe that a British amphibious invasion was being coordinated with and supported by an imminent Armenian insurrection in the vicinity of Dörtyol. Unintentionally, Larkin played a key role in driving the Turks to some very poor decisions.”
 “Three Months off the Syrian Coast,” The Naval Review, 1915, Vol.3, Issue 4
 By this time Armenians had already become “usual suspects” because of the spate of Armenian rebellions and terrorist attacks during the reign of Abdulhamit II, including a very bloody attempt on his life with a VBIED. The Armenians were damned if they did and damned if they didn’t now since they were almost invariably punished at every incident they were involved in, even as mere bystanders. Accordingly, the railroad employees who surrendered to the Doris’s crew requested to be taken away to avoid punishment. The Ottomans were pushing the Armenians into the imperialists’ arms almost as hard as the Great Powers were pulling them.
 Erickson, op. cit. p. 158.
 Paul Chack. Marins à la bataille, Tôme III: Méditerrannée 1914-1918, Gerfaut, 2002. pp. 141-142.
 Eugene L. Rogan. Frontiers of the State in the Late Ottoman Empire: Transjordan 1850-1921, Cambridge University Press, 1999, p. 239.
 Jan Karl Tanenbaum, “France and the Arab Middle East
1914-1920.” Transactions of the American Philosophical Society Vol 68, Part 7, 1978. p. 7
 The US-owned Singer Sewing Machine company, which exclusively employed and catered to Armenians and Greeks, was directly implicated in the 1905 assassination attempt against Sultan Abdulhamit II. After Krisdapor Mikeilian, one of the three founders of the Dashnaktsutsioun (Armenian Revolutionary Federation), blew himself up in Bulgaria while trying to build the bomb for the assassination, the Singer company in Istanbul brought in the famous Belgian terrorist Edward Joris for the job. The VBIED that he built killed 26 people. Joris, like other foreign-backed terrorists caught by the Ottomans, was saved from prosecution by foreign pressure. Abdulhamit then ordered Singer to dismiss all its Greek and Armenian employees, an order that the company and U.S. Ambassador Morgenthau resisted. In February 1915, Agop Basmadjiyan the Singer company cashier in Kilis, the junction of the Berlin-Baghdad and Hejaz railways, was tried and hanged as the regional chief of the Hunchak organisation.
 Hratch Dasnabedian, History of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation Dashnaktsutiun 1890/1924. OEMME Edizioni, 1989. p.116
 Stanford Shaw, “The Armenian Legion and its Destruction of the Armenian Community of Cilicia.” in Türkkaya Ataöv, Ilber Ortaylı (ed.), The Armenians in the Late Ottoman Period, Turkish Historical Society, 2001, p. 188.
Hundreds of years of Ottoman rule in the Balkans ended with massacres and millions of refugees slogging through mud in the cold without food or shelter.
When World War I broke out, Turkey was a quasi-military dictatorship, ruled by the young officers who has seized power in 1913 after the British-backed Kamil Pasha government, itself installed by military putschists, humiliatingly lost the Balkan Wars, the Bulgarian cannons being heard even in the chic quarters of Istanbul. Millions of Turks were massacred or driven out of their ancestral lands in utter destitution , causing an immense trauma among the Muslim Ottoman population, not just from the physical hardship but from the shock of coming up against the violent nationalist hatred of former Christian Ottoman subjects.
Greeks and Turks celebrating the 1908 constitution in Monastir, just 4 years before that Macedonian city would be ransacked by invading Serbs who ethnically cleansed it of all Muslims.
The First Balkan War was the final straw for any hope that the Young Turk reformers of the Committee for Union and Progress (CUP) may have still entertained of creating an Ottoman union, based on equal citizenship, of the disparate etnicities and religions of the failing Ottoman state. They had hoped, along with their many and influent Armenian and Jewish supporters, to turn a new page with the 1908 constitution, hailed all over the the Ottoman lands as the dawn of freedom. The Balkan Wars, sparked by Russian and British fears that the Kaiser and his Ottoman understudies would form a strong union via the Berlin-Baghdad railway that was being built through the Balkans, snuffed out all the hopes and dreams of 1908 revolution.
Field Marshall Colmar Freiherr von der Goltz, or “Goltz Pasha” as the Turks called him, shaped the minds of all the officers who took over the Ottoman state and fought in World War I.
Since the beginning of the century, when Kaiser Wilhelm II took over the reins of the young German state from its founder Chancellor Otto von Bismarck, Germany was engaged in a Drang nach Osten – an eastward impetus – as a result of which its economic and military relations with the Ottoman state were steadily developing. Ever since the Ottomans abolished, or rather slaughtered, their retrograde Janissaries in 1826, forming a modern army to replace them had been a seemingly unattainable top priority. The Prussian officers that Wilhelm sent to Turkey made sure it got done. Foremost among them was Colmar von der Goltz, who took a shine to the Turks, learned fluent Turkish, and trained an entire generation of officers, who worshipped the ground he stood on.
The British put over 100,000 civilians in death camps during the Boer War and killed 28,000 of them, 80 % being children. During the Nuremberg trials, Hermann Goering responded to accusations that he had set up the death camps by pointing out that it was Great Britain that had invented them.
Goltz didn’t confine himself to strictly military matters but also taught his students about politics. He praised the 1908 constitutional revolution that made all Ottoman citizens equal under the law and represented in parliament but he also warned them that in a world of nationalisms, it was impossible for the Muslim Ottoman majority to coexist with the “foreign elements” who were the Armenians, who felt allegiance not to the Ottoman state but to Russia. He proposed to expulse all the Armenians to “the deserts of Mesopotamia,” just as German Schutztruppen had driven the Herero and Nama people of Namibia into the Omaheke Desert, where they perished.  Goltz and his students the CUP officers were highly receptive to the lessons of the Second Boer War (1899-1902) where Great Britain in the person of Cecil Rhodes, seeking to capture the Transvaal diamond fields from the Dutch colonists living on top of them, managed to defeat the formidable Boer guerrilas by destroying their towns, farms, and fields, locking up all their families in death camps and starving them to death until the guerrillas surrendered.  Germany repeated the experiment in Namibia, where it killed off a portion of the Hereros and Namas in the Swakopmund, Windhoek, and Shark Island death camps. 
Goltz’s views, inculcated in his Otoman cadets for over a decade, were shared by all the German staff officers stationed on Ottoman soil in World War I, and by some of the diplomatic staff as well. Vahakn Dadrian, who is widely regarded as the foremost world authority on the Armenian Genocide, states quite unequivocally that the decision to exterminate the Armenians was a Turco-German one:
– Vahakn N. Dadrian. German Responsibility in the Armenian Genocide:A Review of the Historical Evidence of German Complicity
Dadrian notes that various Ottoman officials declared in their memoirs or conversations that the genocide was decided on the insistence of, and according to Rauf Orbay, with “collective urgings amounting to an ultimatum” from, the German staff officers. There is of course a possibility that this was their cover story to shift the blame on the Germans but Dadrian has also found direct deportation orders, demanding “severe treatment” of non-combatant Armenians, issued by General von Schellendorf. The general also instructed the German consul of Erzurum, whose sole function ordinarily would be to defend the rights of Christian minorities, not to do so for Armenians. 
The U.S. genocide between 1899-1902 in the Philippines caused at least a million deaths
Admiral Guido von Usedom, who prepared the Turkish shore and sea defenses at Gallipoli and shared the credit for that great victory with General Otto Liman von Sanders, had a conversation with U.S. Ambassador Henry Morgenthau where he openly admitted that “the Germans had suggested to the Turks the deportation of 100,000 Greeks” and that the Armenians were likewised “removed” because they constituted an obstacle.  Usedom may have thought that Morgenthau could not possibly be shocked by these revelations as his own government had barely finished massacring, torturing, and starving to death over one million Filipinos who were resisting the U.S. colonisation of their country , to loud cries of protest from anti-imperialists like Mark Twain, who advocated replacing the stars in the U.S. flag with a skull and crossbones.
“The Germans to the Front,” a painting depicting British Admiral Seymour ordering Usedom’s marines to lead the assault on a Chinese fort during their abortive attempt to capture Beijing.
Usedom, a purebred Prussian officer unfamiliar with the perfidy and hypocrisy of Great Power diplomacy, spoke with the frankness of a commander who just 15 years earlier had helped save the bacon of the Great Powers in China, where the British and the smaller American expeditionary forces invading and plundering the country had been routed by the imperial army and the Boxer insurgents. Usedom’s Kaiserlischer Marine troops had prevented the failed assault on Beijing commanded by the inept British Admiral Edward Seymour from being encircled and annihilated, while Field-Marshall von Waldersee, unders orders from the Kaiser to emulate the carnage of Attila,  had laid waste to the country after the capture of Beijing. The missionary Arthur Smith commented: “It has seemed as if the foreign troops had come to northern China for the express purpose of committing within the shortest time as many violations as possible of the sixth, the seventh, and the eighth Commandments.”  As the Great Powers’ missionaries and troops went on an orgy of looting and murder and rivers became awash with corpses, journalist E. Dillon describing the holocaust could not suppress a moment of pathos: “I saw two bodies on a low-lying ledge of the shore. . . A father and his boy of eight had been shot down in the name of civilization while holding each other’s hands and praying for mercy. And there they lay, hand still holding hand, while a brown dog was slowly eating one of the arms of the father.” 
According to Peter Balkakian’s book The Burning Tigris, Ambassador Hans Freiherr von Wangenheim told an American journalist “I do not blame the Turks for what they are doing to the Armenians…They are entirely justified”
The Germans had, in effect, kicked in China’s door in service of the U.S.’s “Open Door policy,” all participants of the multinational invasion of China during one of its most severe famines and epidemics having jointly committed the genocidal massacre of hundreds of thousands of Chinese, while indirectly causing the additional deaths from famine, exposure, and disease, of millions, so the last thing that Usedom, a man of honor if not of mercy, had expected was for the U.S. ambassador to use his words to spin a pretext for his country to go to war against Germany.
Admiral Wilhelm Souchon, commander of the Ottoman navy and the man who as skipper of the heavy cruiser Goeben, dragged the Ottoman state into World War I by hoisting an Ottoman flag and bombarding Sevastapol, was far more circumspect in public but he did write in his diary: “It will be salvation for Turkey when it has done away with the last Armenian; it will be rid then of subversive bloodsuckers.”
The German Ambassador Wangenheim was, surprisingly enough, almost as naïve as Admiral von Usedom, when he attempted to bargain with Morgenthau, whose government was technically still “neutral” in the war, for the cessation of U.S. military aid to the Allies in exchange for Germany saving the Armenians from destruction. Boasting “We now control both the Turkish army and navy,” Wangenheim called the Armenians “traitorious vermin” and said “nothing could be guaranteed” if Britain attacked the Dardanelles, urging Morgenthau, whose close relations with President Wilson were well known, to obtain the cessation of ammunition deliveries to Great Britain if he wanted to save the Armenians. “I will help the Zionists,” he said (Morgenthau was one), “but I shall do nothing for the Armenians.” 
 Justin McCarthy. Death and Exile: The Ethnic Cleansing of Ottoman
Muslims, 1821-1922. Darwin Press, 1995. pp. 139-151 Back
 Wolfgang Gust, ed. (2014). The Armenian Genocide: Evidence from the German Foreign Office Archives, 1915-1916, p.XXI Back
 David Olusoga and Casper W Erichsen. The Kaiser’s Holocaust. Germany’s Forgotten Genocide and the Colonial Roots of Nazism. Faber and Faber, 2010. pp. 144-148 Back
 Gregory Fremont-Barnes. The Boer War, 1899-1902. Osprey Publishing, 2003. pp. 60, 61, 63, 77, 79 Back
 Olusoga, David and Erichsen, Casper W. op. cit., pp.162-171 Back
 Vahakn N. Dadrian. German Responsibility in the Armenian Genocide:A Review of the Historical Evidence of German Complicity. Blue Crane Books, 1996. p.90 Back
 Ibid, pp. 117-118 Back
 Ibid, pp. 133-134 Back
 Mike Davis. Late Victorian Holocausts: El Niño Famines and the Making of the Third World. Verso, 2002. pp.198-200 “American officers acknowledged openly in correspondence that starvation had become official military strategy.” Back
 “No quarter will be given! Prisoners will not be taken! Whoever falls into your hands is forfeited. Just as a thousand years ago the Huns under their King Attila made a name for themselves, one that even today makes them seem mighty in history and legend, may the name German be affirmed by you…”
–Kaiser Wilhelm II’s “Hun Speech” Back
 Mike Davis. op. cit. p. 187 Back
 Ibid, pp. 187-188 Back
 Dadrian, op. cit. p.144 Back
A Mountain of Myths
This Musa Dagh is in Adrasan, Antalya, 500km from where the interview was held.
Imagine you’re Frodo the Hobbit setting out on his journey from the Shire to meander into all sorts of unexpected places before reaching Mount Doom. That’s what this series of posts will feel like. The destination of your journey here won’t be as scary as Frodo’s but the meandering part, there’ll be plenty of that.
Our first destination is a physical place: Musa Dagh, somewhere in Turkey. Here’s our first clue: According to this Armenian news agency story, Musa Dagh is a mountain in Hatay, a province of Turkey that was once the Sandjak of Alexandretta before the Turkish dictator Ataturk annexed it and changed its name, something he liked doing a lot, having changed his own name four times . Apparently Armenians lived there and ran into some trouble in 1915, then again in 1939 when they were forced to flee Musa Dagh for good. There’s also something about French warships transporting them in 1915, so this Musa Dagh is probably by the sea.
At the end of the news story, there it is: a photo of mountain by the sea, as billed – except it’s not. That mountain is called Musa Dagh all right but it’s 500 kilometers as the crow flies from Hatay. So what does the Musa Dagh in Hatay look like? Nowhere near as spectacular. The mountain on top of which the elderly gent lives is a low, weathered, rather nondescript mass, not an imposing rocky peak. Honest mistake, right? I mean how is the Armenian news agency that came and interviewed the old man at his home on Musa Dagh supposed to know where Musa Dagh is, especially since it holds such an apparently iconic place in Armenian national history?
Pardon the sarcasm but there is a point to it: The Armenian news agency didn’t pick that fake photo just because it liked it better. There’s more to it than that. There is a whole myth around that mountain that needs to be preserved and its craggy image is part of the myth. From the Turkish dictator calling Alexandretta Hatay and pretending that Hittites founded it to exiled Armenians pretending that their mountain looked sexier than it does, the place is shrouded in myths and fiction. Let’s start to unshroud it.
Hans Werfel, a man in love
This is where the craggy image of Musa Dagh comes from: An artists’s design for the cover of a novel written by Czech poet Franz Werfel who never set foot in the place.
The novel is loosely based on the historical events that took place there in the spring and summer of 1915, as recounted to Werfel by fellow poet and German pro-Armenian activist, Armin T. Wegner, who was a medic under Field Marshall Colmar van der Goltz in Deir ez Zor at the time. Wegner was less interested in the hardships and battles there than in the Armenian deportees who had ended up in the desolation of that arid war zone. He photographed them and got in trouble for doing so, as the Armenian deportation was both approved and backed by his German superiors, the celebrated Field Marshall having said that the Ottoman Empire needed to be cleansed of it “alien elements” the Armenians, for whom he had advocated, long before World War I, a “relocation to the deserts of Mesopotamia.” 
When Wegner found out that Werfel had used his material to write a book, he was furious  but by the time The Forty Days of Musa Dagh was published, Wegner was in all sorts of new trouble, with the Nazis this time, because of his pacifism and his defense of Jews, so he had no time for Werfel. Anyway, Werfel was Jewish himself so the Nazis banned his book before long.
Alma Mahler and Franz Werfel in 1919
Alma Mahler and Oscar Kokoschka, with whom she broke up in 1918
Although Werfel was a Jew by birth, he was no longer one by faith when Hitler came to power in 1933, having renounced Judaism to marry the love of his life Alma Mahler, the talented, seductive, brilliant, and rich widow of the great Gustav Mahler, and an anti-Semite. One of her first recorded impressions of Werfel was “fat, bow-legged Jew.” Theirs was an anguished but surprisingly enduring relationship of dominant disdain and submissive adoration.
Werfel had long resisted Alma’s demand that he renounce Judaism and suffered the moral guilt of their illegitimate love and child while Alma was married to the famous architect Walter Gropius and having an affair with painter Oscar Kokoschka as well. However Alma was not a woman he or anyone else could give up on. She had lain naked on Mahler’s piano, her ex-lover Kokoschka was so smitten he made a life-size sex doll of her, she was a highly talented composer, and did I mention, quite rich? In 1930, he finally relented and they married, going to the Middle East for their honeymoon.
Child labor exploitation in the carpet trade is well-nigh universal.
In Damascus, they visited a carpet-weaving workshop where Alma got emotional over the exploited child laborers, prized for the fine knots that their little fingers could weave. The carpet trader told them a story about their having been orphaned by the evil Turks and how he took them in out of the kindness of his heart.
Musa Daghians back at their homes under the French protectorate flag in the 1930s during a memorial service for the 18 who died fighting in 1915.
Alma was aghast at the Dickensian scene: “Werfel and I left the place, nothing from now on seemed to be of importance or beauty…” It never occurred to the couple that those children were not even born in 1915, let alone orphaned, and that Armenians had now returned to nearby Cilicia, which was a French protectorate. Alma’s emotions for the exploited children, the tale of the carpet-trader exploiting them, and their travelling companion Armin T. Wegner’s account of the desperate Armenian deportees whose plight he had personally witnessed, convinced Werfel to write a book about them.
Musa Dagh refugees in Port Said being trained for the French Foreign Legion.
Newly-built Armenian neighborhood in Aleppo in the early 1930’s, financed by wealthy Armenian benefactors. An even larger neighborhood was built in Bourj Hammoud, Beirut, as well as a village in the Bekaa Valley 50 km from Damascus. More new housing and infrastructure was built in Greece and in the French Cilicia protectorate.
When the Werfels returned to Vienna, Franz went to his friend the French Ambassador Count Clauzel to inquire further about the Armenians of Mousa Dagh, whose plight he thought he had witnessed in the Damascus carpet workshop. France had of course recruited the Musa Dagh Armenians into the Foreign Legion and sent them to fight against the Ottomans and to occupy Cilicia, so it was hardly an objective third party. The count gave Werfel access to French naval records, which should have revealed to Werfel, had he cared to look, France’s aggressive designs in the region (the Picot part of Sykes-Picot carve-up of the Ottoman lands) of which the hapless rural Armenians were clearly made the pawns. But Werfel was only interested in seeing France as an uninterested protector of the Armenians, certainly not as the power that got them into trouble. He also got material from an Armenian catholic order but none whatsoever from the other side, i.e. the Germans and the Turks.
One document influenced Werfel enormously: Pro-Armenian activist Pastor Johannes Lepsius’s tell-all conversation with Ottoman Minister of War Enver Pasha (unconfirmed by anyone else) that was published in chapter 28 of U.S. Ambasador Morgenthau’s 1918 book Ambassador Morgenthau’s Story, where Enver allegedly tells Lepsius quite candidly that he massacred many Armenians and will continue to do so unless they simmer down and foreign powers stop helping them. Werfel tore that chapter out (metaphorically), sexed it up a bit, and pasted it into his own book under the heading “Interlude of the Gods.”
The three heavies of the American Committee for Armenian and Syrian Relief: From left to right, 1) Ambassador to Turkey Henry Morgenthau, the commander of the U.S.’s army of consuls in the Armenian-populated provinces, 2) the J.P. Morgan partner and copper magnate Cleveland H. Dodge who ran the whole show as well as Woodrow Wilson’s foreign policy, and 3) American Board Secretary James Barton, the leading proponent of an autonomous Armenia. Dodge was also the president of Robert College, from where all pro-Armenian missionary activity was orchestrated. 
While Lepsius’s account rings true and jibes with everything else we know about the CUP leadership and its German sponsors, there’s no getting past the fact that Lepsius was no more an objective observer than Wegner was and in fact was in close collaboration with US “diplomatic” missions and US missionaires, whose reports form the backbone of his work The Massacres of Armenia (1919), and who were all employed by US financial and copper magnates seeking to obtain propaganda material against the Turks, Germany’s allies. They intended to use this material to persuade the public that US troops needed to go to Europe to defeat Germany. The extensive network of US diplomatic and Evangelist missions catering to Armenians in Anatolia had no other purpose than to fabricate the pretext for Woodrow Wilson, who got elected on an isolationist ticket, to declare war on Germany, but more about that later.
Franz Werfel as a “historian”
All of this renders Franz Werfel’s novel’s claim to be “historical” highly dubious. Granted, Werfel researched his subject extensively but not exhaustively, completely neglecting to research opposing sources on the matter. He didn’t speak Turkish or Armenian but claimed to present an accurate picture of both Turkish and Armenian parties of the Musa Dagh events, while totaly neglecting the German, American, and British actors, although German was his mother tongue and he spoke English fluently.
Werfel was also hampered by his utter submission to the opinions of his dominating wife, who was Catholic, royalist, reactionary, and utterly anti-Muslim. When he first met Alma, Werfel was something of a communist in 1918, hanging out with the “Red Guard” in Vienna, until one November night when he made a fiery speech and came home drunk to face Alma’s cold disdain, after which he immediately lost all interest in the revolution of the proletariat. Worse still, he gave up his Jewishness to please his mistress. Werfel was simply incapable of saying or writing anything that displeased his reactionary, anti-Semitic, and racist domina. Therefore, we have to think that whatever duty of accuracy he may have felt during the writing of 40 Days, would have fallen by the wayside if it got in Alma’s way.
Finally, Franz Werfel was not a substantive author. He was interested in fame and success, not literary or academic excellence. After having abandoned Judaism and even signed an oath of allegiance to the Nazis at the Prussian Academy of Literature of which he was a proud member (but was kicked out of for being a Jew anyway), he wrote The Song of Bernadette about the miracle at Lourdes, which was an instant hit with all bible-thumpers and not only stayed on the New York Times list for 13 weeks but became an even worse Fox movie. Thomas Mann called it “a well made bad book.” 40 Days wasn’t even well made.
His characters rant interminably about his confused and reactionary political and religious ideas. Even that wasn’t enough for Werfel so he added pages of his own commentary on the virtues of spirituality and the evils of materialism and nationalism. His Gabriel Bagradian bears no resemblance to the actual leader of the Musa Dagh insurgents, who was a Dashnag militant from Yoghunoluk village, Moses Der Kaloustian, not some dispora Armenian with an identity crisis and an Alma-like bourgeouis wife who slept around. Nor did Der Kaloustian oversleep and miss the rescue boat, where no one inexplicably noticed the valorous leader’s absence so that he could get himself tragicomically killed. The real Musa Dagh leader lived a long and prosperous life.
In fact, unless you read 40 Days as some sort of act of homage to the Musa Daghians, it’s just a boring, annoying, and downright silly book, in the image of the silly man who wrote it.
Now that both Werfel and his book are desecrated as they should be, it’s time to pass from fiction – even if it pretends to be “historical” – to facts.
 His real name is Mustafa. He changed it to Kemal, meaning “perfection” when he was a schoolboy. Later during his military career “perfection” started sounding a bit too pretentious so he changed it to Kamal, which isn’t even a word. Finally, he went back to pretentious and decided to call himself “Father of the Turks,” i.e. Ataturk. [Back]
 The Armenian Genocide: Evidence from the German Foreign Office archives 1915-1916, edited by Wolgang Gust, 2014 [Back]
 Werfel’s biographical details are from the books Understanding Franz Werfel by Hans Wegener, 1993 and Franz Werfel: The faith of an exile by Lionel B. Steiman, 1985. [Back]
 Protestant Diplomacy and the Near East: Missionary Influence on American Foreign Policy 1810-1927 by Joseph L. Grabill, 1971, pp. 80-105 [Back]